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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

H. C. TEBBS,
Plaintiff and Appellant
vs.

Case No. 7707

LYXX PETERSON,
Defendant and Respondent

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF CASE
Plaintiff prosecutes this appeal from a judgment
dismissing his cause of action. The judgment of dismissal was ordered entered at the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, which was taken before the court, sitting without a jury. In making its Order of Dismissal,
the Court said: "The court in this matter, after reviewing the authorities submitted by both sides, has concluded that the plaintiff is bound by the testimony
given in the former hearing. The Court has also concluded that considering the plaintiff's testimony and
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the other evidence in this case that he has failed to
establish that he didn't come within the provisions
or the rule set forth in Dalley vs. Midwestern Products
Company, for this reason, that in the present case the
evidence for the plaintiff shows that the collision
occurred on a straight stretch of highway. The plaintiff couldn't have been suddenly blinded by the lights
of an oncoming automobile because had an automobile
been proceeding in the opposite direction he would
have seen those lights immediately after he rounded
the curve. If he was blinded at that time he should
have slowed down. He had a distance of between two
and three hundred feet, as I recall from the testimony,
in which he could have slowed down before this
collision occurred. The motion for a dismissal will
be granted." (Tr. 106)
Thereafter counsel for the parties stipulated that
Findings of Fact be waived and the Court make a
formal Judgment of Dismissal. (R. 131). It is from
the Judgment of Dismissal that plaintiff _prosecutes
this appeal.
In light of the grounds upon which the case was
dismissed it is necessary to review the evidence offered
and received at the trial:
Keishi Hirose testified: That he resides at Los
Angeles. That he was in an automobile with Mr.
Tebbs on January 5, 1947. That they were on their
way from Hannah to Duchesne. That when they
turned beyond the Strawberry River two cars came
with bright lights that blinded him. (Tr. 4) That
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right on the corner there was a great big rock. That
\Yhen they came to that rock and turned there was
a big light that made us blind. That when they made
the turn there was a truck \Yithout lights in the middle
of the road. That he thought it was about 40 feet
from the truck when he first saw the light. That he
tried to stop :\lr. Tebbs who he thought stepped on
the brakes. That he did not know what happened
after the collision because he hit his head and was
unconscious for eight or ten days. (Tr. 5)
On cross-examination, he testified: That he went
\Yith .Jir. Tebbs to see some cattle, which if they were
nice cattle he was going to feed them. (Tr. 8) That
he did not think the truck was 200 feet away when he
first saw it. That he didn't remember making that
statement. That he recalled bringing a suit against
.Jir. Peterson. That he recalled being in the office
of Rex Hansen. ( Tr. 9) That he recalled being asked
the question ''How far was this truck ahead of your
car when you first saw it~" and he answered "I guess
will be two hundred feet." (Tr. 11) That when he
first saw the truck, he yelled to Mr. Tebbs. That Mr.
Tebbs had good lights; that the truck had no lights
behind; that he was not quite sure that he saw the
truck two hundred feet away. (Tr. 13)
Harry C. Tebbs, the plaintiff, testified that: He
is the plaintiff; that he resides in Salt Lake City; that
he is in the insurance business and owns a farm at
Ioka. That he was in Duchesne County, Utah on
January 5, 1947. (Tr. 14) That on that day he had
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been up to Hannah to look at some cattle he had up
there; that Hirose, the J ap, accompanied him; that
the J ap wanted to see the cattle and if they suited
him he and his associates were going to feed the
cattle; that in coming from Hannah you first go South
and then go onto the main highway. That the night
of the 5th of January, 1947 at about 7:00. o'clock he
was driving a 1941 Chrysler; that it was dark and
cloudy. (Tr. 15) That he was traveling about 35 to
40 miles per hour. That as you approach and go
beyond the Strawberry River, your view is obstructed
by a large rock that comes out onto the road as you
turn and there is a mountain that goes back from the
rock a long way so you can't see around ~he rock. That
just after he went around the turn he ran into Mr.
Peterson's truck; that the truck was probably 300
feet or maybe a little more beyond the turn on the
main road going into Duchesne. That just before he
ran into the Peterson truck he was blinded by a very
strong light. (Tr. 16) That he could not say definitely
how far he was from the truck when he first saw it,
but probably fifty-seventy feet. "I can't say." That
immediately when he saw the truck, he threw his foot
on the brake and swung to the left to avoid hitting it.
That he hit the left corner of the truck and part of
his car went under the truck; that he was looking,
straight ahead when he ran into the truck; that he had
his car inspected at least once a month and frequently
twice a month by the Freed Motor Company. (Tr.
17) That he was driving on the right hand side of
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the road and the truck was on the right hand side of
the road when the collision occurred. That there were
no tail lights or reflectors on the rear of the truck.
That Hirose was rendered unconscious in the collision
and '"as seriously injured. That the plaintiff, who
was driving the automobile, was pinned under the
steering wheel and his ribs were broken. (Tr. 18)
That :Jir. Peterson and the two Ivy boys helped
plaintiff out of the car. (Tr. 18) That just after the
collision occurred, plaintiff asked defendant what he
was doing with his car parked · on the highway, and
the defendant replied, ''I am looking for a parking.''
That plaintiff asked to be taken out of the car. (Tr.
19) That plaintiff was taken out of the car to Duchesne
and then to the Roosevelt Hospital where X-rays were
taken for ·which he paid $25.00 (Tr. 20). That the
next day he was taken to Salt Lake to the L.D.S. Hospital where he remained for five weeks, nearly six
weeks; that at the hospital his lungs were treated by
Dr. Viko. That X-rays were taken of his leg and a
twenty pound weight was placed on his leg to pull his
hip down; that his hip was dislocated and broken.
That a Dr. Okelberry operated upon him. He was
operated on twice. (Tr. 21) That he entered the hospital at Salt Lake on the morning of the 6th and was
operated upon 5 or 6 days later; that the first operation was through the knee and the second operation
through the hip into the socket. (Tr. 22) That Dr.
Viko treated the lungs and ribs of plaintiff. That
plaintiff's wife nursed him most of the time; she was
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there most of the time; that he was in the hospital
until about the 12th or 15th of February. That he
was on crutches after he was released from the hospital
for about six months, until about October 1947; that he
used a cane to walk with for nearly two years. (Tr.
23) That he continuously suffered pain and his nerves
were so upset he couldn't digest his food; his stomach
was paining him and he suffered with gas. That at
the time of his injury he was in charge of the office
of the Occidental Life Insurance Company where he
made between six and seven hundred dollars per month
from his labor. That he had at least thirty agents working under him. (Tr. 24) That the costs of plaintiff's
medical and hospital treatment was: Roosevelt Hospital
$25.00, Dr. Boren $25.00, L.D.S. Hospital $59.65 and
later $279.85, Dr. Okelberry $250.00, Dr. Viko $50.00,
Mr. Dillman for ambulance in taking plaintiff from
Roosevelt to Salt Lake $35.00, for a nurse $50.00,
making a total of $840.50 (Tr. 25) which amount was
later corrected to be $824.50. That the automobile he
was driving was of a value of $1800.00 immediately
before the accident and it was sold as a wreck after
the accident for $400.00 (Tr. 26) That the automobile
belonged to the plaintiff, but it was registered in his
wife's name, but she did not claim to own it though
she frequently used it. (Tr. 27) That since the accident the earning power of the plaintiff is about
$200.00 per month; that his health will not permit the
witness to work continuously; that at the time of the
accident the plaintiff was 63 years of age. (Tr. 28)
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On cross-exa1nination, the plaintiff testified that
since the accident he gets down to his office a couple
of hours some days, and son1e days does not go to the
office at all. (Tr. 29) That witness gets part of the
profits that come to the office. (Tr. 31) That the
automobile driven by the plaintiff was in good shape
at the time of the accident. It had good brakes and
good li~hts and on low beam you could see approximately 200 feet in head of you. (Tr. 32) That is an
estimate but he had not checked it; that he did not
know how far the truck was in front of him when he
first saw it, but he would estimate the distance as 50
feet; that it couldn't have been 12 feet that he might
have said it was 12 feet, but if he did that was wrong;
that he may have said twenty feet. (Tr. 33)
Counsel for defendant read from what he claimed
was testimony offered at the first trial the following:

"Q: About how far was it from you when
you first observed it~"
"A: Well that would be hard to say. I don't
think it could have been over twenty feet."
"A: Yes sir. Because I immediately slapped
my right foot down and whirled my car with
all the power I could to the left.''
That at one time he said it was not over twelve
feet, but later he amended his answer and stated that
he thought it was fifty feet; that the place of the
accident was one hundred or two hundred feet fron1
the curve. (Tr. 34) That he was confused by the diagram that was used. (Tr. 35) That he placed the HCT
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on the diagram but later found he was 1n error and
changed the same. ( Tr. 36)
Plaintiff further testified on cross-examination that
his memory is clearer now than it was when he first
testified; that he was very nervous and upset when ~
first testified and hadn't put the study and thought on
it (what occurred at the time of the accident), that he
has now. ''My best recollection now is that I was
blinded.'' That he was conscious following the accident; that at the other trial "I mentioned that they
(lights) must have blinded me, that is my recollection
and there was something prevented me from seeing
that car, it must have been blinding me.''
That he testified as follows at the former trial:

'' Q. Well didn't you tell us, Mr. Tebbs
that the truck that you saw on the highway,
or the object, was about twelve feet in front of
you when you first saw it~
A. That's right, when I saw it.
Q. Then you were watching ahead of you,
weren't you~
A. Well, the only thing that has got me
there, if I may answer, there could have been
a car coming that might have blinded me somewhat.
Q. Well, was there a car coming~ Did
you see any car coming~
A. I don't know.
Q. Well, in other words the fact there
could have been a car coming is just a possibility, you don't remember anything like that,
do you, at this time~
A. I don't.''
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Did you so testify'
•· ~\.. I did. The '"itness further testified.
But may I state I was thinking of lights, not
car, if you are blinded you can't see a car, I
couldn't. (Tr. 40)
Q. ~\s a n1atter of fact, didn't you tell us
before that when you testified the reason you
didn't see the truck was as you came east around
the curve your lights shot off the highway, and
when you suddenly straightened out to go southeast on the straight-of-way the truck was right
in front of you; didn't you so testify that~
A. I think so, yes sir, that's right.
Q. The last time we were over here on
this case we were here about three and a half
days, were we not~
A. I was, yes sir.
Q. And other than what you said there
was a possibility there was a car could ha:ve
blinded you, there wasn't anything said about
lights any time during that trial, was there~
A. This was the only instance I remember
of.
Q. And in your testimony at that time that
was a mere possibility; isn't that right~
A. That was right as to lights, but as to
car I don't contend I ever saw a car, I was
blinded. That is the confusion of that testimony." (Tr. 41)
Plaintiff further testified that he was blinded a
second after he came around the turn and got
straightened up which was approximately 100 feet
around the turn; that he was traveling 35 or 40 miles
per hour; that the glare of the lights were such that
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he couldn't say whether there was one or two lights;
that ever since the accident he has had in mind something that prevented him from seeing the car; that
he was looking down the highway and driving carefully; that he did not have time to turn to his left and
go around the truck because he was doing his best.
(Tr. 43) That the truck was in the right driving lane
and the other lane was clear; that at the time of the
collision his car had been turned about three feet to
the left to avoid hitting the truck; that according to
his judgment the truck was stopped at the time of the
collision. (Tr. 44) That after the collision, plaintiff's
car and the truck were six or eight feet apart. (Tr.
46)

Rulon Ashby, a witness called by the plaintiff, testified that he is in the insurance business; that on January 5, 1947 he was on his way, in an automobile
driven by Mr. Bodily, from Salt Lake City to Vernal;
that on the evening of that day as it was getting dark
he saw Mr. Lynn Peterson about half way to the top
of Daniels Canyon. (Tr. 58) That the lights had been
turned on the Bodily car; that the Peterson truck was
loaded with feed and stopped in the right hand lane
of traffic; that there were no lights on the rear of the
truck. (Tr. 59) That Mr. Peterson was having trouble
with the fan that runs the generator and asked Mr.
Ashby to call his, (Peterson's) Mother and to send
some one to come out and help him. (Tr. 60)
The testimony of Elise Ashby is to the same effect
as that of her husband. Mrs. Ashby further testified
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that the front lights on ~lr. Peterson's truck were on
when he was stopped on the road in Daniels Canyon ;
that there were no rear lights on the truck. (Tr. 645)
:Jlr. Owen Bodily, called as a witness by the
plaintiff, testified that he resides in Vernal; that on
January 5, 1947 he, in company with Mr. and Mrs.
Ashby and ~Irs. Bodily, was driving his automobile
from Salt Lake to Vernal ; that prior to seeing a truck
up in Daniels Canyon, he turned on his lights ; that
he saw Mr. Peterson and his truck about half way
up the hill from Heber; that there were no rear lights
on the truck; that at the time he saw Mr. Peterson
and his truck, it was getting dark. (Tr. 66-7)
The testimony of Mrs. Myril Bodily, the wife of
Owen Bodily, is to the same effect. (Tr. 69)
Robert Marchant, a witness called by the plaintiff, testified that he resides at Ioka; that he is acquainted with Mr. Tebbs, (Tr. 69) and with Lynn
Peterson (Tr. 70) ; that he was at the scene of a collision between an automobile driven by Mr. Tebbs and
a truck driven by Mr. Peterson about four years ago.
That he and Mr. Wilkerson were on their way to Salt
Lake in an old Packard with a semi-trailer body built
onto the back of it. (Tr. 70) That shortly after they
crossed the bridge west of Duchesne an automobile
passed them; that was about a mile or a mile and a
half East of the place of the accident; that the automobile that passed them was going in the same direction as they were, which was towards Salt Lake. (Tr.
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71) That when they pulled onto the top of the hill
they could see the headlights of two or three cars
down the hill; that as they approached the scene of
the accident, they met a car just leaving and the truck
was moving when they first passed it. ('Tr. 72) That
the Tebbs car was not moving when he first saw it;
that when he first went over to the cars they were probably eight feet apart, maybe a trifle more; that the
truck was right near the center of the road when he
first saw it; that after it was moved two of the left
two wheels were off the hard surfaced portion of the
highway. (Tr. 73) That he saw Mr. Peterson who
asked for and got a pair of pliers from Mr. Wilkerson with whom Mr. Marchant was riding; that when
he arrived the J ap was still in Mr. Tebbs car in a
semi- conscious condition; that he remained at the
scene of the the accident from one-half to an hour,
perhaps more than that. That there were no taillights on the truck; there was a light on the right-hand
side some eight or ten inches from the corner upon the
south side as the truck faced east; (Tr. 74) that there
were no other lights or reflectors on the back end of
the truck; that when he first saw the Tebbs car it was
across the highway; that the collision occurred near
the hotel sign. (Tr. 75-6) That the car that took Mr.
Tebbs away pulled out just as they got to the scene
of the accident. (Tr. 77)
David Marlin Wilkerson, a witness called by the
plaintiff, testified that he resides at Roosevelt, Utah
and is a welder and mechanic, (Tr. 83) and has been
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such since 1942; that from his experience he can tell
whether a break in a piece of metal is a new or old
break; that he "·as in company with Mr. Marchant in
a Packard with a trailer on his way to Salt Lake when
they came to the place where a collision had occurred
between the automobile of Mr. Tebbs and the truck of
Lynn Peterson; that the collision occurred about four
or five miles west of Duchesne. That :a number of
cars passed them between the scene of the accident
and Duchesene; that one car passed probably about
a mile east of the point of collision; that the witness
was traveling about 20 to 25 miles per hour; that the
car that he recalls passing him was traveling about
30 or 35 miles per hr. (Tr. 85) That when he arrived
at the top of the hill east of where the accident occurred, he noticed the lights and then a spotlight was
wavering across the road in front of them; that he
probably remained at the scene of the accident about
an hour; that the witness helped Mr. Peterson put out
flares; that there were no lights on the rear of the
truck and the witness did not notice any reflectors;
that he looked under the truck to see if there were
any tail lights (Tr. 86) ; that there had been a tail
light on the side of the truck on the frame, but the
wires weren't connected; that the wires had been
broken for quite sometime; that one set of the wires
was rusty and the other was full of dirt and corroded ;
that there was a clearance light along the left-hand
side that had been broken and one on the right hand
side that was all right, but the wires had been broken
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off; (Tr. 87) that the clearance light was along the
side of the truck probably eight inches back of the
corner along the side of the frame toward the front.
(Tr. 88) That when he arrived at the scene of the
accident, the truck was on the oil and the car was kind
of kitty-corner over the yellow line. They were about
eight feet apart; that the left-hand dual of the truck
was right near the yellow line; the truck had ten tires;
some of the tires were flat; that the truck was loaded
with sacks which were brown and appeared to contain
feed of two hundred pounds each. ( Tr. 90)
On cross-examination, he testified that the channel frame on the hack of the truck had been bent up;
that the auto had evidently hit the truck on the left
side. (Tr. 94)
Mrs. Dot F. Tebbs, the wife of the plaintiff testified about the nature of the plaintiff's injuries and
that she did not own the automobile that her husband
was driving at the time of the collision, but as such
matters do not bear directly on the question presented
for review, we shall not abstract her testimony. (Tr.
100 et seq.)
After the plaintiff had offered the evidence which
we have heretofore summarized in some detail, the trial
court took the case from the jury and orally made
the order which we have heretofore quoted in this
Brief. Later on May 12, 1951 the Judge signed the
written Order of Dismissal which was filed in the
court below on May 15, 1951 (R. 131) It is from the
Judgment of Dismissal that plaintiff prosecutes this
appeal.
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~-\.SSIG XhlE~TS

O:B-, ERROR

The plaintiff assigns as error the trial court's
Judgment of Dismissal. The error committed by the
trial court in disn1issing the action may be discussed
under two points, they being:

POINT ONE
The trial court was in error when 1n its oral decision it in effect held that the plaintiff was bound by
the testimony given by him at the former trial and
being so bound he could not be heard to now claim
that he was blinded by the lights of a motor vehicle
coming from the opposite direction which prevented
him from seeing the truck in time to avoid the collision
which resulted in his injury. (R. 131)

POINT TWO
The trial court was in error 1n dismissing the
cause on the ground that as a matter of law the plaintiff
was guilty of contributory negligence which proximately contributed to the plaintiff's injury and the
damage to his automobile. (R. 131)
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ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
PLAINTIFF IS NOT BOUND BY THE TESTIMONY
WHICH HE GAVE AT THE FIRST TRIAL AND EVEN IF
HE IS SO BOUND, SUCH TESTIMONY DOES NOT AS A
MATTER OF LAW PRECLUDE HIM FROM RECOVERY
IN THIS ACTION.

It will be noted that Mr. Tebbs, the plaintiff, at
a former trial testified that he did not see the truck
until he was within about twelve feet from the truck
(this testimony was later changed to fifty feet). Mr.
Tebbs was asked these questions and gave these
answers:

"Q. Well didn't you tell us, Mr. Tebbs,
that the truck that you saw on the highway, or
the object, was about twelve feet in front of
you when you first saw it~
A. That's right, when I saw it.
Q. Then you were watching ahead of you,
weren't you~
A. Well, the only thing that has got me
there, if I may answer, there could have been
a car coming that might have blinded me somewhat.
Q. Well, was there a car coming~ Did you
see any car coming~
A. I don't know.
Q. Well, in other words, the fact there
could have been a car coming is just a possibility. You don't remember anything like that
do you at this time~
A. I don't.''
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Plaintiff gave this version of his reason for so
testifying on the former occasion.
· 'Q. Did you so testify~
~-\.. I did, but may I state I was thinking of
lights, not cars. If you are blinded, you can't
see a ca~ I couldn'~
Q. As a matter of fact didn't you tell us
before that when you testified the reason you
didn't see the truck was as you came east around
the curve your lights shot off the highway, and
when you suddenly straightened out to go southeast on the straight-of-way the truck was right
in front of you; didn't you so testify that~
A. I think so, yes sir, that's right."
Further on in his testimony, he answers that he
was confused, in that he was being questioned about a
car and he had in mind lights; that he did not contend
that he saw a car; that he was blinded so that he could
not see the car; that it might have been a motorcycle
but he believed it was a car. (Tr. 41)
The testimony of the plaintiff as to there being
bright lights on a motor vehicle approaching from the
east just before the collision is corroborated by Mr.
I-Iirose, the J ap, who was riding in the front seat with
the plaintiff. Mr. Hirose testified that he was blinded
and did not see the truck until within fifty feet of it.
Certainly if the J ap was blinded as he testified he was,
it is a reasonable conclusion that the jury might reach
that the plaintiff was blinded. The testimony of Messrs.
Marchant and 'Vilkerson tends to corroborate the
testimony of plaintiff and the J ap in that an automobile
passed them at a time when it might well have been
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in such a position on the road that it could have prevented the plaintiff in the exercise of due care from
seeing the truck until it was too late to avoid hitting it.
Moreover, the authorities and adjudicated cases
do not support the doctrine announced by the trial
court in his oral decision that the plaintiff is bound
by the testimony he gave at the first trial. The authorities are to the contrary. It is a matter of every day
occurence that a witness on further reflection concludes
that he has been in error in his testimony and later
seeks to correct the error. Indeed if a witness concludes he has erred in giving testimony, it frequently
becomes his duty to correct the same. Any other rule
would frequently perpetuate an injustice.
The following are among the text writers and
adjudicated cases which are at variance with the holding of the trial court as to the effect of prior testimony
given by a witness:
The law touching the effect of former testimony
given by a party to an action is thus stated in 31 C.J.S.,
Section 402, page 1211 ;
"Testimony by a party on a former trial of
the case or of another case will not estop him
from giving testimony contradictory thereto if he
can show his former testimony was given inconsiderately, by mistake, or without full knowledge of the facts. His former testimony is not
conclusive against him even though it is unexplained.''
A number of cases are cited in a foot note to the
text and we have added a number of other cases to
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the san1e effect. Among the cases so holding are: Jones
v. J.llajor, 55 S.E. (2nd) 846; 80 Ga. app. ~23; Smith v.
Produ.cers Cold Storage Co. (Mo) 128 S. W. (2d)
299; Pogu.e v. Oreat X orthern R. Co., 148 N. W. 889;
1~7 ~linn 79; Schroeder v. Wells, 298 S. W. 806; Little
v. Straw (Pa) 192 Atl894; Rowe v. Goldberg Film Delirery Lines 50 Ariz. 285, 72 Pac (2d) 432; Goodwin
et al v. Robinson et al., 22 Cal App (2) 283; 66 Pac
(~d) 1:257; J{yne v. J(yne, 38 Cal App (2) 122; 100 Pac
(2d) 806; Hall v. Bakersfield Community Hotel Corporation, 5~ Cal App (2) 158; 125 Pac (2d) 889; Rage v.
Valentine, 280 N.Y. 268; 20 N.E. (2d) 751; McClary v.
11litchern, 29 S. E. (2d) 329. The case of Morton v. Hood
tends to support the general rule, 105 Utah 484; 143
Pac (2d) 434.
The foregoing cases go much farther in support
of the view that prior statements made by a party
or other witness at a former trial are not binding at
a subsequent trial than is necessary to go here. Indeed, the testimony of the plaintiff at the prior trial
is not necessarily at variance with the testimony he
gave at the trial which is here on appeal. It will be
noted at the former hearing, counsel for the defendant
on his cross-examination studiously refrained from inquiry about any lights and confined his questions as to
whether or not the witness saw a car. If the witness
had said he saw a car as he rounded the curve just before the collision occurred, counsel would doubtless have
argued that the witness could not see the car if he
was blinded. The plaintiff apparently did not want to
fall for such entrapment.
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POINT TWO
THE FACTS IN THIS CASE DO NOT SHOW THAT THE
PLAINTIFF AS A MATTER OF LAW WAS GUILTY OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE THAT PROXIMATELY
CONTRIBUTED TO HIS INJURIES AND THE DAMAGE
TO HIS AUTOMOBILE.

In its Oral Decision the court took the view that
this case falls within the doctrine announced in the
case of Dalley v. Mid-Western Dairy Products Co. 80
Utah 331, 15 Pac (2d) 309. The facts in the Dalley
case and the cases upon which it is based are so unlike the facts disclosed by the evidence in this case
that the Dalley case may not be said to be a precedent
for the ruling here complained of.
In the Dalley case, a truck was parked on the
oiled portion of the highway without any lights in the
rear. The road over which Mr. Dalley was driving was
a level oiled highway and was straight for a mile or
more before Dalley reached the place where the truck
.was parked; there was nothing to obstruct ~ir. Dalley's
view; Dalley met no one and no one passed him in the
vicinity of where the truck was standing; there was
no wind, the moon was not shining, it was not cloudy,
it was an ordinary summer night; Dalley was travelling about 25 miles per hour. He could have brought
his car to a dead stop in 50 feet at that speed, if he
had seen the truck forty feet away he thought he
could have stopped or turned and thus avoided the
collision that resulted in his injury.
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It is quite apparent that the controlling facts in
this ease are so unlike the facts in the Dalley case
that the former case is of little value in reaching a
proper conclusion in the present case. The cases are
alike in that a truck, contrary to law, was parked on
the oiled portion of the highway without any lights
on the rear of the truck. In such particular the cases
are alike and conclusively show that the defendant in
each case was guilty of negligence at the time of the
collision.
In this case the evidence shows that a large rock
obstructed the view of the plaintiff at a point where
the road turned from an easterly to a southeasterly
direction and a ridge or mountain extended from the
large rock so that one approaching from the west could
not see around the rock. Unlike the facts in the Dalley
case, the evidence in this case shows that at a point
about 100 feet beyond the curve (as plaintiff rounded
the curve) a bright light blinded plaintiff and his
companion so that he, for an instant, was unable to
see the truck which was loaded with brown sacks and
without any lights on the rear of the truck.
The testimony in this case shows that the defendant's truck was parked at a distance estimated from
200 to 300 feet Southeasterly from the curve in the
road where the big rock obstructs the view of one approaching from the West towards the East (Tr. 34
and Tr. 16). The evidence also shows that as plaintiff
had rounded the curve and had straightened his automobile so that the lights threw down the highway and
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at a point about 100 feet from the curve, he was blinded
by the lights of the oncoming car (Tr. 43). He saw the
truck when a distance of between 50 and 70 feet from
it (Tr. 17), and during the time it took him to cover
that distance he was making every effort to avoid
the truck. He, therefore, was blinded a distance of
from 50 to 150 feet during which he did not see the
defendant's truck on the highway. The reaction time
of men of his age is at least a second and traveling at
a speed of thirty-five or forty miles an hour he had to
have from fifty to sixty feet before he could react. It
is thus apparent that the short interval of time did
not give him an opportunity to slow down or stop.
If the truck had been equipped with red lights on
the rear it is reasonable to assume and the jury would
certainly have been justified in finding that plaintiff
would have seen the red lights in time to avoid the
collision. The very purpose of requiring red lights on
the rear of motor vehicles is to warn the traveling
public that there is danger ahead.
It will be noted that the Dalley case was decided
by a two to three decision. The decision has been subject to some adverse criticism but has not been reversed. However, this Court has refused to extend the
doctrine of that case. In the cases of Nielsen v. Wa~tan
abe, 90 Utah 401, '62 Pac (2d) 117; Trimble v. Union
Pacific Stages, 105 Utah 457, 142 Pac (2d) 674 and
Moss v. Christensen-Gardner Inc., 98 Utah 253, 98 Pac
(2d) 363, this Court has held that the doctrine announced in the majority opinion in the Dalley case is
subject to limitations and exceptions.
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In the cases of Nielsen v. Jr atanabe and Moss v.
Christensen-Gardner Inc., supra, this Court held that
when one is blinded by the lights of an oncoming automobile and while so blinded and without sufficient time to
slow down collides with an automobile or other obstruction unlawfully placed on a highway without warning signals or lights, he nmy not be said to be guilty
of contributory negligence. In the Trimble case the
Court followed the same rule but applied the exception to a driver of a vehicle whose vision was temporarily restricted by fog.
To the same effect is the doctrine announced in
3-4 Huddy Cyclopedia of Automobile Law, 9th Edition,
Page 59, Section 30 and the cases there cited.
The testimony in this case brings it clearly within
the law announced in the foregoing cases.
\Ye find· it difficult to follow the Court's logic in
reaching the conclusion he did and still greater difficulty in believing that it was within the province of
the Court to lay down a rule of law to the effect that
it was the duty of the plaintiff to slow down or stop
when he saw an automobile approaching from the opposite direction. If the operator of a motor vehicle is
required to slow down or stop when he sees an auto-.
mobile approaching from the opposite direction, we
wonder what will happen to traffic, especially where
there may be two or more automobiles proceeding in
the same direction in close proximity to each other and
especially out in the country where traffic moves at
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a greater speed. If the automobile In the lead should
suddenly slow down or stop, the automobile immediately
behind might well collide with the automobile in the
lead thereby resulting in injury and liability to the
operator of the automobile so suddenly slowing down
or stopping.
Moreover, the plaintiff did not testify that he was
blinded immediately after he made the turn. Section
57-7 198 (2), Utah Code Annotated, requires that the
headlights on automobiles shall be of sufficient intensity
to reveal persons and vehicles at a distance of at lea.:;t
200 feet. Section 57-7 191 of the Code provides that
a parked or stopped vehicle must be equipped with a
red light in the rear visible at least a distance of 500
feet. The evidence shows that the plaintiff had his
lights inspected at least once a month and that the
same were in good condition. That being so, his lights
should reveal the parked truck at a distance of 200
feet from the rear. If the plaintiff was traveling at
3! rate of 35 or 40 miles per hour he was covering between 50 and 60 feet per second. He was blinded a
distance of from 50 to 150 feet. He had only between
one and three seconds to slow down or stop. If the law
is so exacting as the trial Court indicates in his oral
opinion, namely that a driver of an automobile even
though temporarily blinded, has no cause to complain
of injuries sustained by him because another, at night
parks his truck ~without rear lights on a public highway, then no useful purpose is served the public by requiring vehicles to be equipped with lights.
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CONCLUSION
\Ye submit that the Court should have submitted
the case to the jury and that this Court should remand
the ca~e to the Court below with directions to grant
a new trial and that plaintiff should be awarded his
costs herein.
Respectfully submitted,

ELIAS HANSEN,
J. GRANT IVERSON,
Attorneys for Plainttiff-Appellant
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